EduAsiaNews, Jakarta – After tracing the trajectory of national development across different presidential eras, and re-examining the relationship between the state, conglomerates, strategic projects, social conflicts, and environmental degradation, a fundamental question emerges: when a project is labeled “strategic,” strategic for whom, for what purpose, and at what ecological cost?
This article is written as a contribution to clarifying the meaning and direction of development, which should serve as a way for this nation to nurture life, uphold justice, and preserve Indonesia’s
Deforestation in the Era of Indonesian Presidents
Indonesia’s development trajectory shows that forests have often been the first space sacrificed in the name of progress. The history of deforestation in Indonesia reveals a continuous decline in natural forest cover, following shifts in development orientation under each presidential administration.
During the era of Soekarno, pressure on forests began to increase alongside state consolidation, agricultural expansion, timber demand, and early post-colonial infrastructure development. Under Soeharto, forest destruction became most massive and structural, as development relied on forest concession rights (HPH), transmigration, plantations, mining, timber industries, and land-based economic expansion. The Habibie transition period saw extremely high pressure on forests due to the economic crisis, weak enforcement, illegal logging, and restructuring of natural resource assets.
In the Reformasi era, deforestation did not disappear but changed its pattern. If previously it was concentrated through large state and conglomerate concessions, decentralization later dispersed forest pressure through regional permits, palm oil expansion, pulp, mining, and infrastructure. During the administrations of Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, deforestation continued within the context of Reform and regional autonomy, when natural resource permits became more dispersed and forest governance increasingly fragmented. Later, under SBY, climate commitments began to emerge through REDD+, primary forest and peatland moratoriums, yet palm oil, pulp and paper, and coal expansion remained dominant pressures.
In more recent eras, ecological pressure has not only taken the form of logging. It has emerged through mineral downstreaming, smelters, industrial zones, food estates, bioenergy, dams, and National Strategic Projects (PSN). The Jokowi era shows a decline in official deforestation rates, yet ecological pressure has shifted toward nickel downstreaming, smelters, PSN, the new capital city (IKN), food estates, and biodiesel. Under Prabowo, the main risks arise from food and energy self-sufficiency agendas and large-scale land clearing. Environmental degradation in this new era has changed form: from forest loss to water crises, peatland degradation, coastal pollution, habitat fragmentation, spatial conflicts, and industrial emissions.
National Development and Patterns of Conglomeration
National development has never been neutral from relations of economic power. The relationship between national development, patterns of conglomeration, and environmental degradation in Indonesia has continuously evolved following each presidential political-economic regime.
During Soekarno’s era, the state was the main actor through nationalization and state-owned enterprises. Under Soeharto, conglomerates grew closely tied to the state through forestry concessions, mining, palm oil, pulp, cement, and food industries. After Reformasi, conglomerates did not disappear; they adapted to democracy, regional autonomy, and global markets.
During Soekarno’s period, development focused on state consolidation, nationalization of colonial assets, and state enterprises, so environmental pressures were mainly related to agricultural expansion, colonial-era plantations, timber demand, and population pressure. Under Soeharto, the New Order system produced conglomerates closely connected to the state through forestry, palm oil, mining, food, and extractive industries; during this period, environmental damage became structural through deforestation, forest degradation, pollution, and agrarian conflict.
From the Habibie to Megawati periods, Reformasi did not automatically improve natural resource governance; old conglomerates adapted, while decentralization expanded permits, rent-seeking, illegal logging, and tenure conflicts. Under SBY, climate agendas and moratoriums began to emerge, but coal, palm oil, pulp and paper, and commodities remained key economic pillars.
Today, this pattern continues to evolve. Development conglomerates are no longer based only on timber and palm oil, but also coal, nickel, smelters, industrial estates, biodiesel, and food-energy sectors. The Jokowi era shifted ecological pressure toward infrastructure, PSN, nickel downstreaming, smelters, IKN, food estates, and biodiesel. Under Prabowo, an emerging pattern combines strategic state-owned enterprises, palm oil–mining–nickel conglomerates, and food-energy self-sufficiency, with major ecological risks from large-scale land conversion if not controlled by environmental carrying capacity.
A critical question remains: when the state requires growth and the private sector provides capital, who ensures that forests, water, land, indigenous communities, and future generations are not the ones who bear the cost?
Social Conflict and Environmental Degradation in National Development
Social and environmental conflicts in Indonesia’s development follow a recurring pattern: large projects arrive with narratives of progress, yet local communities often bear the ecological and social burdens. Many development conflicts are not merely about compensation. They are conflicts over living space.
During Soekarno’s era, conflicts emerged in forms such as inundation and spatial transformation caused by the Jatiluhur Dam and early tourism development in Sanur. Under Soeharto, conflicts became more structural, including dam construction, mining projects, land displacement, agricultural loss, mountainous degradation, tailings, and pressure on indigenous communities. The Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid periods saw forestry and pulp industry conflicts, illegal logging, and permit expansion, resulting in pollution, deforestation, and tenure disputes. Under Megawati, several cases reflected coastal pollution risks and the inundation of settlements and cultural sites. The SBY era was marked by the Lapindo Mudflow and the Kendeng conflict, highlighting pollution, loss of living space, and threats to karst systems and water sources. Under Jokowi, Wadas and Rempang illustrated conflicts over mining materials and island/coastal conversion. In the ongoing Prabowo era, the Merauke Food and Energy Estate and the Bangka Belitung tin mining crisis reflect new risks of large-scale land clearing, loss of local food systems, coastal degradation, and livelihood conflicts.
These conflicts are not merely about trees or land-use change. They concern human life and ecological systems that sustain it: water sources, rice fields, coastal ecosystems, sago forests, fishing grounds, and cultural heritage sites. Therefore, development that displaces people from their living space cannot be considered “strategic,” even if supported by regulations and large investments.
National Strategic Projects
Strategy is a conscious, directed, and long-term choice to set objectives, select priorities, allocate resources, manage trade-offs, and determine pathways for achieving goals under conditions of scarcity, uncertainty, and competing interests.
In Indonesia’s development context, PSN (National Strategic Projects) are formally understood as projects or programs implemented by the government, regional governments, and/or business entities because they are considered strategic for economic growth, equitable development, job creation, public welfare, and national and regional development.
However, from a critical academic perspective, PSN should not only be understood as large-scale projects that receive regulatory privileges, fiscal support, accelerated permitting, land acquisition facilitation, and institutional backing from the state. PSN must also be seen as instruments of development power that reshape living spaces, social relations, land use, and the distribution of benefits, risks, and impacts.
Therefore, the meaning of “strategic” cannot be determined solely by investment size, land area, infrastructure connectivity, export value, or speed of economic growth. It must also be measured by the capacity to maintain ecological carrying capacity, respect spatial planning, protect natural forests, peatlands, water systems, biodiversity, indigenous and local rights, public health, and the safety of future generations.
A project can only be called truly strategic if it not only accelerates development but also ensures that development is socially just, ecologically safe, transparently governed, and sustainable for life.
Reframing the Meaning and Direction of Development
What is missing in development projects is alignment with ecological carrying capacity, the harmony of Indonesia’s Earth, and social justice. Therefore, the definition of “strategic” must be redefined.
A project deserves to be called strategic only if it protects natural forests, peatlands, water systems, biodiversity, local food systems, indigenous rights, public health, environmental justice, and the safety of future generations.
True development is not a festival of extraction at the expense of the Earth and future generations. Development should be a way for a nation to nurture life, uphold justice, and preserve Indonesia’s Earth, ensuring the continuity of life for both present and future generations.
